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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,:
vs.

supreme Court No. 16,636

WILLIAM LUIS FORSYTH,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This was a criminal prosecution on five counts of theft by
deception, second degree felonies in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 405, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This case was tried by a jury on June 25, 26 and 27, 1979,
before the Honorable George E. Ballif, Judge of the Fourth Judicial
District Court, in and for the State of Utah, Provo, Utah County,
Utah.

Count V of the information was dismissed during the trial

and a verdict of guilty was returned by the jury on the remaining
four counts on June 27, 1979, from which verdict the defendant
appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-appellant prays that this Court dismiss the information or grant the defendant a new trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

I

Defende_nt was the organizer and officer of a Utah corporatior. (
Investors entered into an agreement with the co~poration to invest!
funds.

In exchange, the investor received a written contract

fro:r

the corporation to have certain items performed including the
repayment of the investment within a certain time.

The four in- (,

vestors set forth in the information invested $5, 000 each.

The

written contract stated that the funds were to be repaid out of
future membership sales, which were to commence after certain
physical facilities were built.
of

f~nds

There was approximately $300,00~ (

available to the corporation before and after the invest~1

invested such $20,000.
r

The physical facilities were commenced but never finished
and the corporation became insolvent and did not pay such debts.
There were other promises, opinions, and representations made in
conjunction with the execution of the written contracts.

Because

the venture failed, many of these oral promises, etc., were not
performed.
During the trial, the trial Judge allowed other investors
not listed in the information and in fact some investors that
invested in other corporations to testify that they did not
receive their money back.
her life savings.

One investor was a widow who invested ,

However, she never talked with the defendant or

one of his agents before such investment.

There were a total of
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I

ten other investors that were allowed to testify that they did

11(

not receive ·their money back, in addition to the four investors

"·11

set forth in the information.·

1:f

POINT I
DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE
OF THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE WHICH TENDED TO
SHOW THAT HE HAD COMMITTED OTHER CRIMES OR
CIVIL WRONGS.

(

This case involves the single issue of whether the defendant
was denied the right to a fair trial by the admission into evidence
I(
'

:o:I

I

of the testimony of investors other than the alleged victims in a
case of theft by deception, where the testimony of those witnesses
as to alleged civil wrongs did not come within the exceptions of
Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and was highly prejudicial to the defendant.
At the trial, the Court admitted over objection, the testimony
of nine witnesses who were investors, but who were not among the
four

witnesses listed in the information as "alleged victims".

The Court admitted the testimony to show the over-all pattern or
scheme or design of the defendant.

(T. 252, L. 2-9),

Rule 55,

Utah Rules of Evidence, prohibits generally the admission of evidence
of other crimes or civil wrongs, except when relevant to prove some
other material fact such as, inter alia, the plan of the defendant.

!

The admission of such evidence was contrary to the principle
set forth by this Court; namely, that the issue in a criminal trial
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

should be whether the defendant is guilty of the specific~(
charged in the information.

Other evidence of crimes, criminal

conduct, or wrongdoing should not be admitted for the purpose of
disgracing the defendant
commit~

crime.

~ ~

showing defendant's propensity!.£

State of Utah v. Vira Mason, 530 P.2d 795,

1 Whartont Criminal Evidence, SECS.

233, et seq.

1955); State v. Dickson, 12 U.2d 8, 264 P.2d 412.

(Twelfth Ed.
(emphasis

added).
The general rule is that in a criminal case, evidence which
shows or tends to show that the defendant had committed other

crimes in addition to that for which he is on trial is inadrnissatt
Olson v. Swap£, 535 P.2d 1232 (1975).

(emphasis added).

In State of Utah v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, the Court stated
as follows:

"This Court has stated on numerous occasions that

evidence of other crimes allegedly committed by the defendant is
not admissable if the purpose is to disgrace the defendant as a
person of evil character with a propensity to commit crime and th
likely to have committed the crime charged."
The Court has also stated that there must be " ... some legitimate purpose to be served by the evidence which is otherwise
competent and relevant."

State v. Mason, 530 P.2d 795.

In the present case, the State represented to the Court tha
the evidence of other investors should be admitted for the expre
purpose of showing a common plan or scheme.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•.,

5
This Court has set a specific standard for receiving such
evidence.

Such evidence is admissable only if it will "show

a conunon scheme or plan embracing commission of similar crimes
so related to each other that the proof of one tends to establish
the crime for which the defendant is on trial."
Supra.

Olson v. Swapp,

(emphasis added).

In the present case, the evidence from the other investors
did not meet the standard for the exception set forth by Rule 55
as defined by this Court.

On the contrary, such evidence tended

to show the defendant had the propensity to commit other civil
wrongs or crimes and was grossly prejudicial.

Such evidence, as

a matter of law, did not show a common scheme or plan.
Other than the "alleged victims" in this business endeavor,
the State called nine other investors to testify.

Their testimony

did not show a common plan or scheme, but did grossly prejudice
the defendant's right to a fair trial by parading witness after
witness before the jury who complained, not of any misrepresentations by the defendant, but that they didn't get their money back
from their investment.
Perhaps the most damaging example of this was the testimony
of Helen Evans.

Mrs. Evans testified that she invested in June,

1973.

However, she didn't even meet the defendant until January,

1974.

(T. 259, L. 12-17).

The defendant made no representations

to her prior to her investment (T. 257, L. 19-28), but Mrs. Evans
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relied on the representations of a relative.

(T. 256).

The

sum and substance of her testimony, though, was that she was a
widow (T. 260, L. 17-18) who invested her $12,500 and didn't
get a dime back.

(T. 263, L. 17-21).

This testimony of a civil

wrong allegedly done by defendant was highly inflammatory and
prejudicial to the defendant.
Three other witnesses also were allowed to testify that they

I

put their money in but didn't get it back, even though they, too, I

nad not even spoken to the defendant about the investment prior tol
making it.

One of these was Ralph Ladle, the "alleged victim" of

Count V of the information, which count was dismissed (T. 396)
after Ladle testified that he had no conversations with defendant
prior to investing.

(T. 269, L. 24-29).

Yet, he was still

I

allow~

to testify that he didn't get his money back (T. 275, 276).
Armstrong also testified the defendant made no representations
prior to his investment (T. 293, L. 10-17), as did Hewitt
(T. 296, L. 4-18, 25-30).
Other witnesses included Brown, who gave no evidence of fraua
or a common scheme or plan, but testified he did not gEt t.is money
back (T. 287, L. 23-25); Park, who also gave no evidence of a comll
scheme, but did not get his money back (T. 306, L. 2-4); Thorell,
again no evidence of the common scheme, but didn't get his money
back (T. 311, L. 30; 312, L. 1); Taylor, with no evidence of a
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common scheme, but who didn't get his money back (T. 319, L. 20-21);
Terry, with,no evidence of a common scheme or plan, but who also
got no money back (T. 327, L. 11-12); and Brothers, with no
evidence of a common plan or scheme and who got no money back
(T. 347, L. 29-30).
The sheer weight of the numbers of witnesses put on by the
State for the purpose of showing that many people didn't get their
money back from this investment, even though not showing the common
scheme or plan by the defendant to commit the crimes with which he
was charged, shifted the burden to the defendant, inflamed the
jury, and denied the defendant the right to a fair trial on the
information before the jury.
This evidence showed the defendant's propensity to commit the
crimes charged, rather than that he committed the specific acts
alleged in the information.

The evidence was introduced, received

and viewed by the jury for purposes other than the exception to
the general rule as set forth by the trial Court.
CONCLUSION
The trial Court committed reversable error in overruling
defendant's objections to the introduction of evidence of other
crimes or civil wrongs contrary to Rule 55.

Having allowed the

evidence before the jury, the trial Court should have considered
the prejudicial effect of such evidence on the defendant's ability
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to obtain a fair trial and should not have denied defendant's
motions to dismiss and for a directed verdict.
Respectfully submitted this

~

day of August, 1980.

QJ~st maJ~
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

I

I
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